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JAMES C. WHITTAKER,
Platn.tiff,
VB.

RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whose name
RICHARD LEO SPENCER, as Administrator has been substituted, JOHN
EDISON SPENCER, ELIZABETH A.
TmBS, VORD SPENCER, IRWIN M.
PRICE, SlMON HUGENTOBLER, (in
whose place Que Jensen has been substitut~) INDIANOLA IRRIGATION
COMPANY and the STATE OF UTAH,
Def~.

REPLY BBIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEALED FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
JOHN A. HOUGAARD, JUDGE
ELIAS HANSEN
.Aitone.eg for defendants and
Ofltllebts Jolm Ediso-n Spe~r
Gtki Eliaabeth, .A. Tibbs
AJ,I.AN G. THURMAN
.Aflo.rneg /Of' clef~ ONl appelkmt,
BiC'hord Loo Spencer, .Aamim.isttratM
J. VERNON ERICKSON
DILWORTH WOOLLEY
.Attonll6y& /Of' Pw,;.tiff
JENSEN &; JENMN
.A~s for defettdtmt and cross complainom,t,
1ttditMola Irri.gatiDta. Oompomty
JOHN S. MCALLISTER
.Atton.eg for def6flltlmtt Que J emen.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah

JAMES C. WHITTAKER,
Plaintiff,

vs.

I

RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whoRe name
R~C_HARD LEO SPENqFm, as Ad- \
mm1strator has been suhsbtute<l, JOHN \
lj~DT~ON SPJ<jNC.F~R, ELIZABETH A.
TIBBS, VORD SPENCER, IRWIN M.
PRlCl<~, SIMON HUGl<~NTOBL~~R, (in

Case No.

7181

whose place Que .Jensen has been substitnted,) INDIANOLA IRRIGATION ,
COl\fPANY and the STATE OF UTAH, f
Defen-dants. ·

There are some matters discussed in the briefs of
the respon<lents and cross appellant which appellants
deem of sufficient importance to require a reply brief.
In order to avoid repetition we shall discuss all of tlw
questions argued in the various briefs, in this, appellant's
reply hrief.
Tn the brief filed on behalf of Que Jensen it is conceded, as we understand it, no elaim is made that he is
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entitled to more than 55 acres or shares of class "A"
water right. He makes no claim that he is entitled to any
right to Class "B" water right. That being so there is
no controversy between appellants and respondent, Que
Jensen, as to the amount of water to which he is entitled.
Appellants do contend, however, as pointed out in our
original brief that the Jensen water right is represented
by certificate No. 84 for 125 shares and not otherwise.
It is argued on page 4G of the plain tiff and respondent Whittaker's brief that because Whittaker had
never become a stockholder of the Indianola Irrigation
Company and because the appellants are not the owners
of any class '' B '' water right they may not be heard to
complain because Whittaker was awarded 60/1728th of
the total flow of Thistle Creek and its tributa6es. It
will be noted that in the mortgage given to Whittaker
and in the various proceedings had in the attempted foreclosure of that mortgage and in the sheriff's deed no
mention is made of 60/1728ths of the flow of Thistle
Creek and its tributaries. The language used in the
various instruments is "together with sixty (60) shares
in the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock
Creek in addition to water now used for the irrigation
of the above described lands.'' So far as the record shows

R. H. Spencer never did own any class "B" stock. -While
the evidence shows that he once owned 448 shares of
class ''A'' stock he, so far as the evidence shows, never
owned 448/1728th of the right to the use of the waters
of Thistle Creek or its tributaries.
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Moreover, it will be noted that by the terms of
Article 5 of the articles of incorporation of the Indianola
Irrigation Company it is proviued that from March 15th
to .J nne 15th the owner of class '' B '' stock shall he entitlf~<l to the same quantity of water per share as the
class "A" stock. (See plaintiff's J1~xhibit 7). Thus by
awarding to Whittak•er 60/1728ths of the water of Thistle
Creek he is given more water than he is entitled to and
the same is taken from the other water right owners,
hoth the class "A" anu class "B". The evidenee also
~;hows that tlie waters of Thistle Creek and its tributaries
were (1istributed by the Indianola Irrigation Company
without regard as to whether the same was repr,esented
hy shares of stock or otherwise.
'I'he fact that the court below awarued to Whittaker
G0/1728ths of the waters of Thistle Creek further sho\VS
that the Whittaker mortgage is so vague and uncertain
tliat neither the trial court nor counsel who drew the
<1eerep can tell what water was mortgaged or foreclosed.
Notwithstanding the evidence is all to the contrary
counsel for vVhittaker bases much of his argument on
the erroneou:; assumption that R. H. Spencer mortgaged
28;) shares or acres of stock to the Federal Building and
Loan

As~;oeiation.

'l'hat mortgage was executed by H. l\L

t-;pencer, lda Spencer, R. Leo Spencer, Grace Spencer,
H. H. Spencer, Leo Harold flpencer and Fern Spencer.
(:::lee gxhibi t G) '1'he land covered by that mortgage
di<l not belong to R H. Spencer. That R H. Spencer
mortg-age<l only 22:1 acres or slwres of water is made
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undisputably evident by the assignment. (Irrigation Co.
Exhibit 1) Neither of the appellants, John Edison Spencer or Elizabeth A. Tibbs wer,e parties to that mortgage
or the foreclosure thereof.
On pages 13 to 15 of the Whittaker brief some comfort seems to be derived from giving bad names to the
parties who are resisting plaintiff's claim. We are at
a loss to see wherein such argument can add to plaintiff's
claimed title to the water right claimed by him or detract
from the appellants claim to such water right. It would
have been very enlighting if counsel had cited some
authority bearing upon the question of the materiality
of what someone might think of his adversary has upon
the question of the rights of the parties to the controversy. vVe have always understood the law to be that
such matters are not germane to a civil action. If plaintiff's title to the water right is valid or invalid it is so
without regard as to who may or may not be the parties
litigant. As to the Price affidavit as we pointed out in
the original brief the same is not competent evidence
to prove the absence of title in the appellants.
Beginning on page 15 of respondent's brief it is
argued that Hadlock had not lost his right to the use
of the water right in controversy because he did not
secure the sheriff'3 deed until December ~), H)i37. Plaintiff overlooks the fact that on October 29, 1933 Richard
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer conveyed to appellant
.John JiJdison Spencer the South one-half of the Southeast quarter of Section 5, Township 12 'South, Range 4
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East, Salt Lake Meridian, together with 80 acres of
water in what is known as Thistle Creek. This action
was not commenced until July, 1941 which was more
than 7 years after John Edison acquired the water right
represented by certificate 73. John Edison Spencer
owned, occupied and used the land and water right adversely to the claim of the plaintiff and all the world for
more than the statutory period. That the statutes of
limitations ran against the plaintiff is the holding of
this court in the case of Boucofski vs. Jacobson, 104 Pac.
117; 36 U. 165. Neither of the appellants was a party to
the Hadlock mortgage.
Beginning on page 17 of the Whittaker brief it is
argued that appellants are estopped from claiming that
the ~Whittaker mortgage is void. We again call the attention of the court to the fact that neither of the appellants was a party to the Hadlock mortgage and so they
could not be hehl to any covenants in that mortgage .
.i\Ioreover if the mortgage is void, as we contend, it is
void for all purposes. As we have pointed out in our
original brief an instrument which is void is without
legal effed. It is the same as if the instrument did not
exist.

vV e

ltave heretofore in our original brief discusse(l

the claimed disclaimer of the appellants. 'l'he claimed
disclaimer did not apply to the water right then claimed
by Whittaker. 'l'he principal difficulty with plaintiff's
contention is that no one can tell what GO acres of water
was the subject matter of that action. Apparently the
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court in the judgment and decree in this case and counsel
who drew the same abandoned all claim of a right to
GO acres of water and concluded that plaintiff was entitled to 60/1728ths of the water of Thistle Creek and
its tributaries. There is a ::mbstantial difference between
60 acres or shares of water in Thistle Creek and
60/1728ths thereof.
It is further contended that appellants are estopped
hy the judgment rendered in case No. 2888 Civil. Of
course if that judgment is valid they are estopped but if
void for uncertainty, as we contend, they are not
estopped. A void judgment is the same as no judgment.
That being so it cannot work on estoppel. To say that
the judgment constitutes an estoppel is to give it at least
some validity. We have no quarrel with the law cited on
pages 21 to 24 of plaintiff's brief. The difficulty with the
law there cited is that it has no application to the facts
in this case. The law there cited applies to valid judgments or judgments that are at most voidable. If a judgment is void there is nothing to appeal from because in
law it does not exist. A void judgment cannot settle any
rights because in contemplation of law it does not exist.
In this connection we direct the attention of the
eourt to the findings and attempted judgment or order
touehing the matter of the Spencers transferring water
rertificates or conveying water right. \Ve have heretofore, in our original brief, pointed out that such matters
,.,~ere

wiihout any il'l::;ues raised hy plaintiff's complaint
and the answers thereto. l\loreover, such findings and
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judgment do not fall within the rule of res adjudicata.
In paragraph 14 of the decree of foreclosure in case
2888 it is, among other things, provided that: "The court
hereby retains jurisdiction of this cause for further
hearing upon the rights asserted by the Indianola Irrigation Company against said defendants." So far as we
have been able to ascertain the courts uniformly hold
that the doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to final
judgments. 31 Am. J ur., Sec. 436, page 95 and cases there
cited. l\foreover, as pointed out in the original brief
there is nothing which specifically awards to the plaintiff any right to the water right claimed by the appellants, especially is that so as to the water right evidenced
by certificates 72 and 73. If the court will read the decree of foreclmmre in 2888 it will look in vain to find any
language therein which foreclosed the mortgage on the
water right represented by certificates 72 or 7i3 or any
other water right that can be identified.
Bcg·inning on page 2~) and extending to page 46 of the
\Vhittaker brief much is said about the elusive character
of a water right and of the difficulty of describing the
same with any degree of accuracy. If a water right is
appurtenant to land and as such real property all that
one need to do is to describe the land to which it is appnrtenant. On the other hand if it is represented b~,
shares of stock all that need be done is to describe the
certificate giving the number thereof, the number of
shares, the date of issue or other identification marks
so tlmt rwrsons dealing with the right or the courts in
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fixing the rights may determine with some degree of certainty what is the subject matter of the mortgage or
conveyance. Anything short of that is certain to lead
to confusion and makes property and property rights
dependent upon a mere f:,ruess as to who is the owner
thereof or has an interest therein.
1t is the function of the law to prevent such results.
If the mortgage in this case had described the land upon
which the water right was used that plaintiff claims was
covered by the mortgage we would not be here attacking
the validity of the mortgage.
If the Hadlock mortgage or the decree of foreclosure
thereof is held to be valid no one could buy or take a
mortgage on any part of the 448 shares or acres of
water right owned by Spencer without running the risk
of being confronted with the claim that the Hadlock mortgage covered the particular 60 shares or acres of such
water right that may have been purchased or taken as
security for a loan.

On page 33 of the Whittaker brief there is a quotation from the case of Payton, et al, vs. Browning, 290
Pac. 253. The citation is apparently in error as no such
case is reported in 290 Pacific. However, the citation
sounds like good law. It is difficult to see how the law
there announced can aid the plaintiff in this case. There
is nothing in the mortgage here involved which indicates
the particular water right that was intended to be covered hy the mortgage. Even if it should be concluded
that the mortgage covered the water right evidenced hy
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certificates 72 and 73 the uncertainty Is by no means
removed. The most that can be said is that the field of
uncertainty is narrowed down to 160 acres or shares instead of 448. If as plaintiff seems to contend the mortgage covered the water which was appurtenant to the
land upon which the water represented by certificates 72
and 73 was used. If so which 60 acres of the 160 acres of
water right was covered by the mortgage? No one can
tell either from the language of the mortgage or from
any evidence offered at the trial. To say that the mortgage covered any particular water right is a mere guess.
If it covered the water represented by certificate 73
then and in such case the Hadlock mortgage is barred
because .John F~dison Spencer at the time the action was
brought had owned and used the water for more than 7
years. If it is the water represented by certificates 84
or 8G for 12G and 160 shares or acres of water then and
in such case the plantiff is precluded from asserting any
such claim because he is bound by the foreclosure proceeding had by the Federal Building and Loan Association.

vV.

H. Hadlock and .John A. I\falia, State Bank

Commissioner, through whom plaintiff claims title were
parties defendant in that proceeding. It is of course
elernentar:· that a judf,rment is binding on those who
are in privity with a party to a judgment. That leave,,,
the water right represented by certificate number 72
for disposition. Is there any evidence in the mortgage
or for that matter in the evidence which shows or tends
to show that the parties intended that the Hadlock mort-
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gage covered the water right represented by certificate
numbered 72.
In its finding numbered 19 the trial court found that
the 55 shares of water right to Simon Hugentobler and
the 600 shares of water right to the State Bank Commissioner should come out of certificates 72 and 73. J. R.
2fi1 and 2G2. \Ve have already pointed out that John
Edison Spencer had used that water for more than 7
years. Such use was adverse to his father, R. H. Spencer,
Hugentobler, the plaintiff and his predecessors in title.
That being so neither plaintiff nor Hugentobler have
any valid claim to that water. If Hugentobler 's right is
to be taken out of certificate 72 there remains only 25
shares for plaintiff from that source. To say that the
parties to the Hadlock mortgage intended that the same
should cover that mortgage is a mere guess, and is at
variance with the claim made by the Bank Commissioner
in his mortgage foreclosure. It is likewise at variance
with the decree entered in this case.
On pages 17 and 18 counsel for the plaintiff discusses the covenants contained in a mortgage. Even if we
should concede all that is there said about covenants in
a mortgage such concession would add nothing to the
description contained in the Hadlock mortgage. The most
that conl<l be said with respect to any covenants contained
in the mortgage is that if the covenants were broken a
cause of action for damages wonld accrue to the covenantee. That is the remedy awanled for the hreaeh of a
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covenant. Obviously neither the mortgage foreclosure
nor this proceeding is such an action.
On page 41 is quoted a provision from Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1888 to the effect that : ''The right to the
use of water may be measured by fractional parts of the
whole source of supply, or by fractional parts, with
limitation as to period of time when used." In our view
the law just quoted maJ.::es against plaintiff in that it requires that a right to the use of a water must be definite.
The description of the water ri.ght mentioned in neither
the Hadlock mortgage nor the decree of foreclosure de;.;cribe or even tend to describe a fractional part of any
whole source of supply or limitation as to period of time
of use.
In his brief plaintiff seems to he under the impression that we are questioning the sufficiency of the language of 60 acres or shares of water right. That is not the
basis for our contention. Our contention is that there
is no way of determining or identifying any particular
60 acres or shares out of the 448 acres or shares of water
right that was owned by Spencer. Of course if Spencer
had mortgaged or conveyed all of the 448 shares or acres
of' water right which he owned there could be no uncertainty or ambiguity. AJI that need be done in such
case i.s to a:-;certain the number of shares or acres that
\vere owned by Rpencer. VVhen the Federal Building and
Loan Association conveyed i.ts water right to the Indianola Irrigation Company H1e conveyance covered all its
water right in Thistle Creek. Such a conveyance so far
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as our investigation reveals has met with uniform judicial approval.
On page 44 of plaintiff's brief it is argued that
Spencer mortgaged a water right to Thistle Creek. ~With
that we agree. It is ah;o said that it is clear that Spencer
did not intend to give a second mortgage. With that we
cannot agree. It is by no means unusual to give a second
mortgage or for a mortgagee to accept a second mortgage, especially when the mortgagor is in financial difficulties as was R. H. Spencer when he gave the mortgage.

It is also said that the water right mortgaged wa:-; on
Section 5, the Wan;,;its Farm. That is where counsel for
plaintiff not only engages in speculation but departs
from the claim made by Hadlock in his complaint and
from the decree of foreclosure in neither of which is
mention made of certificates 72 or n or the land :-;ituated
in Sections 5 or 8. 11oreover, even if the Hadlock mortgage may, contrary to our contention, claim that the
Hadlock mortgage covers a water right represented by
either certificates numbered 72 and 73 or land in Sections 5 or 8, which certificates or what land to which
water is appurtenant is coverefl hy the mortgage. No one
know:-; or has the means of finding out. It was evidently
because of such unsurmountable difficulty that plaintiff
was awarded 60/l728th of the water of Thistle Creek,
an award \Vholly without support in the evidence.
The conclusion that may be reached by this court
is fraught with far reaching importance. If the Hadlock
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mortgage and the decree of foreclosure thereof is held
to be valid no one can safely purchase or take a mortgage on a water right lest some one who claims a lien
on some indefinite part thereof shifts his claimed lien
to such a part as may suit his convenience.
The questions discussed in the brief of the Indianola
Irrigation Company is for the most part discussed in our
original brief and elsewhere in this brief. lt is true as
stated in the brief of the Indianola Irrigation Company
that Elizabeth A. Tibbs testified that she had never received the twenty acres of primary water right mentioned in the deed dated May 31st, 1931 from R. H.
Spencer and his wife, Annie H. Spencer. That conveyance
is a faet in the case and shows that the father and mother
of }frs. Tibbs intended that she, Mrs. Tibbs, should have
a water right with the land which was conveyed.
lt is further argued that appellants in the court below claimed that all the certificates of water right were
valid. It is true that appellants made such a claim and
made the further claim that without regard to whether
the certificates were or were not valid the water right
represented by the certificates, in dispute, was appurtenant to tho land upon which said water right was and for
many years last past had been used.
It was the Indianola Irrigation Company that made
tho attack on certificates No. 72 and 73. rt1hat Company
seem:,; to take the inconsistent position that it can repudiate the is:,;uance of the certificates and still maintain
the elaim that Spencer conveyed to the Indianola Irriga-
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tion Company 160 acres or shares of water right in
Thistle Creek. As we pointed out in our original brief
the authorities hold that if a transaction or contract
is rescinded it must be rescinded in toto. The law does
not permit a partial rescision. If the transaction whereby
certificates 72 and 73 are revoked it necessarily follows
that the water right represented by such certificates is
and a'lways has been appurtenant to the lands conveyed
to John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs.
There are a few matters discussed in the cross appeal
of Richard Leo Spencer, administrator, which we deem
require a reply. On pages 43 to 45 it is argued that because of the provisions contained in case No. 2888 restraining Richard H. Spencer from disposing of certificates 72 and 7:~ or any other water rights held by him
that any transfer of water rights in Thistle Creek and
its tributaries are a nullity. \V e have already discussed
that matter in our original brief' and shall not here reveat
what is there said.
Even conceding that the court, contrary to our contention, had jurisdiction to make such an order the same
could not possibly be of any aid to R H. Spencer's administrator because; First, Richard H. Spencer had made
two conveyances of the water represented by certificate
No. 73 before the judgment in case 2888 civil was entered. As far back as September 15, 1~)3;~ Richard H.
Spencer an<l his wife, Annie H. Spencer, conveyed to
John F~. Spencer the South one half of the Southwest
Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 ]1~ast,
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Salt Lake Meridian, together with 80 acres of water in
what is known as Thistle Creek. On October 29, 1933 a
new deed was given to correct the description of the land.
That deed also recites: "Together with 80 acres of water
in what is known as Thistle Creek." Both deeds were
placed on record soon after they were executed. (See
transcript pages 51 and 52 and John I<Jdison Spencer's
Exhibit 12) Second, neither R. H. Spencer nor his administrators may now be heard to attack his own wilful
acts on the ground that he was enjoined from conveying
away his water rights. The provisions in the decree relied upon were not intended for his protection. Nor may
he nor his representative take advantage of his own acts
upon the ground that he was enjoined from performing
the same. The law in such particular is discussed at some
length in 24 Am. Jur. page 263, Sec. 114; page 265, Sec.
116; page 267, Sec. 118; page 289, Sec. 150; page 290, Sec.
151. Numerous cases will be found collected in the foot
notes to the text which support the same.
'l'he authorities above cited in the mam deal with
fraudulent conveyances. rrhe principles of law are however applicable here in that if the injunction, even if
valid, was obviously intended to prevent the certificates
or water rights owned hy them from coming into the pos;,;ession of an innocent purchaser for value.
::\foreovcr the provisiom; of the claimed injunction
doc>s not <~ven purport to enjoin the Spencers and the
rl'ihhs from making transfers among themselves. As
tlw.\· nn~ all enjoined it could not possihl~· make any dif-
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ference to any one for whose benefit the purported injunction was issued as to which one of the enjoined
parties might hold the title to the water right referred
to in the alleged injunction. It will be noted that they
are all enjoined from making a transfer. There is nothing in the language which purports to prevent them from
making a transfer among themselves and no useful purposes could be served by so restricting the right of Richard H. Spencer from dealing with his property. Certainly he could not be enjoined from making a will disposing of his property, including his water right. By
the same token when he knew that his end was near, to
say that he was enjoined from fixing up his property
among his children is, in our view, wholly without support in the records before the court.
On pages 33 to 42 of the brief of the administrator
it i8 argued that there was an over issue of stock by the
Indianola Irrigation Company. Obviously there was no
over issue directly to R. H. Spencer because at no time
was there any stock issued to Hichard H. Spencer other
than the certificate for 160 shares.
It is argued in the brief of the administrator of the
estate of R. H. Spencer that there is no competent evidence showing that H. H. Spencer conveyed the 160
shares of water evidenced by certificate 86 to John
Edison Spencer. V{e have discussed that phase of the
case in our original brief.

\Ve again direct the attention of the court to the
fact that the administrator offered evidence as to what
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John Edison Spencer had testified to on a prior hearing
as to the water right in dispute. That being so the administrator in legal effect made John Edison Spencer his
witness. The administrator could not procure from John
Edison Spencer evidence favorable to his side of the
controversy and then prevent John Edison Spencer from
testifying as to matters that were unfavorable to the
administrator. Under such circumstances the authorities
teach that the incompetency of a witness is waived.
On pages 50 to 58 of the administrator's brief it is
contended that the water right represented by the certificates is not appurtenant to the land upon which the
same was used throughout the years. We have covered
that question in our original brief. We shall not repeat
what is there said, except to again observe that at no
time was the water right owned separate and apart from
the owner of the land.
·when the land was mortgaged the water right was
mortgaged. When the mortgages were foreclosed such
foreelosure was had on both the land and the water right
used thereon. There were times when there was only
a small flow of wa:ter and all of the water was put into
one stream, but even then the water was always applied
to the lands upon which the water had always been used.
Indeed so far as the evidence shows there was no other
land upon which it could be used.
vVe submit that the judgment and decree of the
eourt helow should he reversed to the end that the plaintiff is without right to the water right claimed by him,
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that Simon Hugentobler be awarded only 55 shares or
acres of water right; that the other water rights be
awarded 80 shares or acres to Mrs. Tibbs and the remainder to John Edison Spencer and that appellants be
awarded their costs incurred in this court and in the
court below.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Appellants.

